he concept of a learning curve for individuals has been in widespread use he concept of a learning curve for individuals has been in widespread use in the psychology literature since the beginning of the twentieth century. in the psychology literature since the beginning of the twentieth century. Ebbinghaus (1885) famously demonstrated the fi rst learning curve by Ebbinghaus (1885) famously demonstrated the fi rst learning curve by memorizing ever-longer strings of nonsense syllables; Bryan and Harter (1899) memorizing ever-longer strings of nonsense syllables; Bryan and Harter (1899) studied learning curves exhibited by telegraph operators sending and receiving studied learning curves exhibited by telegraph operators sending and receiving Morse code; and Book (1908) studied a learning curve in typing skills. The idea Morse code; and Book (1908) studied a learning curve in typing skills. The idea that a phenomenon analogous to the learning curve might also apply at the level that a phenomenon analogous to the learning curve might also apply at the level of the organization took longer to emerge, but it had begun to fi gure prominently of the organization took longer to emerge, but it had begun to fi gure prominently in military procurement and scheduling at least a decade before Wright's (1936) in military procurement and scheduling at least a decade before Wright's (1936) classic paper providing evidence that the cost of producing an airframe declined as classic paper providing evidence that the cost of producing an airframe declined as cumulative output increased. cumulative output increased. Wright (1936) , who was careful Wright (1936) , who was careful not to describe his empirical results as a to describe his empirical results as a learning curve, proposed three explanations for the relationships between cost and learning curve, proposed three explanations for the relationships between cost and cumulative quantity produced that he observed. The fi rst was the "improvement in cumulative quantity produced that he observed. The fi rst was the "improvement in profi ciency of a workman with practice" (p. 124), characterized by the individual profi ciency of a workman with practice" (p. 124), characterized by the individual learning curve. The others were "the ability to use less skilled labor as more and learning curve. The others were "the ability to use less skilled labor as more and more tooling and standardization of procedure is introduced," and "the greater more tooling and standardization of procedure is introduced," and "the greater spread of machinery and fi xture set up time in large quantity production" (p. 124). spread of machinery and fi xture set up time in large quantity production" (p. 124). Only the fi rst of these is what we would unambiguously identify as a source of orgaOnly the fi rst of these is what we would unambiguously identify as a source of organizational learning; the others are consistent with organizational learning but also nizational learning; the others are consistent with organizational learning but also with standard static economies of scale. with standard static economies of scale.
between cost and cumulative output. Arrow was among the fi rst to apply the concept between cost and cumulative output. Arrow was among the fi rst to apply the concept to a time horizon far beyond those typical of applications to procurement and to a time horizon far beyond those typical of applications to procurement and scheduling of narrowly-defi ned products, thus demonstrating that organizational scheduling of narrowly-defi ned products, thus demonstrating that organizational learning could have important economic implications. Arrow was the fi rst to propose learning could have important economic implications. Arrow was the fi rst to propose an explicit interpretation of the relationship between cost and cumulative quantity an explicit interpretation of the relationship between cost and cumulative quantity produced as an organizational learning curve, and he also seems to have been the produced as an organizational learning curve, and he also seems to have been the fi rst to apply the term learning-by-doing at the level of the organization rather than fi rst to apply the term learning-by-doing at the level of the organization rather than the individual. In particular, Arrow (p. 156) argued that the decline in production the individual. In particular, Arrow (p. 156) argued that the decline in production costs was a costs was a consequence of the accumulated experience, because "it is the very activity of the accumulated experience, because "it is the very activity of production which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected of production which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected over time." over time."
It quickly became apparent that the notion of organizational learning as It quickly became apparent that the notion of organizational learning as a by-product of accumulated experience has important consequences for fi rm a by-product of accumulated experience has important consequences for fi rm strategy. This realization was made fi rst, not in the economics literature, but in the strategy. This realization was made fi rst, not in the economics literature, but in the emerging industry of business strategy consulting. In 1966, the Boston Consulting emerging industry of business strategy consulting. In 1966, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) built its fl edgling consulting business around the concept of what it Group (BCG) built its fl edgling consulting business around the concept of what it branded the branded the experience curve. Billed as a radical departure from traditional learning . Billed as a radical departure from traditional learning curves "which applied only to direct labor," according to Henderson (1973) , the curves "which applied only to direct labor," according to Henderson (1973) , the BCG asserted that cost reductions associated with cumulative output applied to BCG asserted that cost reductions associated with cumulative output applied to all costs, were "consistently around 20-30% each time accumulated production is all costs, were "consistently around 20-30% each time accumulated production is doubled, [and] this decline goes on in time without limit" (Henderson 1968 ). The doubled, [and] this decline goes on in time without limit" (Henderson 1968 ). The BCG soon found experience curves everywhere it looked. John Clarkeson, at that BCG soon found experience curves everywhere it looked. John Clarkeson, at that time a partner in BCG, later recalled (as quoted in Kiechel, 2010, pp. 37-8) : "For time a partner in BCG, later recalled (as quoted in Kiechel, 2010, pp. 37-8) : "For the next fi ve years, maybe more, we applied experience curves to anything that the next fi ve years, maybe more, we applied experience curves to anything that moved, and a lot of things that didn't." The experience curve led the BCG to advise moved, and a lot of things that didn't." The experience curve led the BCG to advise fi rms that new products "should be priced as low as necessary to dominate their fi rms that new products "should be priced as low as necessary to dominate their market segments or probably not be sold at all," and that "market share should be market segments or probably not be sold at all," and that "market share should be maintained at all costs" (Henderson 1968 ). maintained at all costs" (Henderson 1968) .
There is, perhaps, some hubris in the BCG's telling of the history of its experiThere is, perhaps, some hubris in the BCG's telling of the history of its experience curve. After all, Wright (1936) had 30 years earlier documented cost-quantity ence curve. After all, Wright (1936) had 30 years earlier documented cost-quantity relationships not only in the direct labor component of total costs, but also in materelationships not only in the direct labor component of total costs, but also in materials use, intermediate inputs, and indirect costs. rials use, intermediate inputs, and indirect costs.
1 1 Nonetheless, outside observers Nonetheless, outside observers share BCG's view of the profound infl uence of its formulation of organizational share BCG's view of the profound infl uence of its formulation of organizational learning. For example, the editors of the learning. For example, the editors of the Harvard Business Review recently selected recently selected the experience curve as one of fi ve charts that "changed the world" (Ovans 2011 ). In the experience curve as one of fi ve charts that "changed the world" (Ovans 2011) . In a recent history of the strategy consulting business, Kiechel (2010, p. 31) concluded: a recent history of the strategy consulting business, Kiechel (2010, p. 31) concluded: "The experience curve was, simply, the most important concept in launching the "The experience curve was, simply, the most important concept in launching the [business] strategy revolution . . . no other idea was to set in motion such an altera-[business] strategy revolution . . . no other idea was to set in motion such an alteration in corporate consciousness." tion in corporate consciousness."
In the world of economic research, formal explorations of the strategic implicaIn the world of economic research, formal explorations of the strategic implications of organization learning began to appear as part of the expanding application tions of organization learning began to appear as part of the expanding application of dynamic methods to industrial organization. For example, organizational learning of dynamic methods to industrial organization. For example, organizational learning was shown to affect dynamic pricing strategy because production costs are expected was shown to affect dynamic pricing strategy because production costs are expected to fall as cumulative production increases (Rosen 1972; Spence 1981; Clarke, to fall as cumulative production increases (Rosen 1972; Spence 1981; Clarke, Darrough, and Heinecke 1982) . Organizational learning can also promote industry Darrough, and Heinecke 1982) . Organizational learning can also promote industry concentration and imperfect competition (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983; Dasgupta concentration and imperfect competition (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988) ; indeed, it can create concentration out of initially identical fi rms and Stiglitz 1988); indeed, it can create concentration out of initially identical fi rms by inducing them to be indifferent between dramatically different pricing and by inducing them to be indifferent between dramatically different pricing and survival strategies (Petrakis, Rasmusen, and Roy 1997) . Organizational learning can survival strategies (Petrakis, Rasmusen, and Roy 1997) . Organizational learning can also create incentives for incumbent fi rms to engage in predatory behavior that also create incentives for incumbent fi rms to engage in predatory behavior that deters entry and promotes exit Riordan 1994, 1997; Hollis 2002) . As I deters entry and promotes exit Riordan 1994, 1997; Hollis 2002 ). As I demonstrate in Thompson (2010) , the specifi c strategic consequence of learning demonstrate in Thompson (2010) , the specifi c strategic consequence of learning is, in each case, dependent on the auxiliary assumptions made in any given model, is, in each case, dependent on the auxiliary assumptions made in any given model, but the sense that organizational learning has potentially profound consequences but the sense that organizational learning has potentially profound consequences is pervasive in the literature. is pervasive in the literature.
In the 50 years since Arrow's (1962) paper appeared, empirical research on In the 50 years since Arrow's (1962) paper appeared, empirical research on organizational learning curves has continued unabated. Numerous studies have organizational learning curves has continued unabated. Numerous studies have appeared each year documenting that the relationship between cost and cumulative appeared each year documenting that the relationship between cost and cumulative quantity produced, that was fi rst described by Wright, can be found in enormously quantity produced, that was fi rst described by Wright, can be found in enormously varied settings (for reviews of this literature, see Yelle 1979; Argote and Epple varied settings (for reviews of this literature, see Yelle 1979; Dutton and Thomas 1994; Dar-El 2000, chap. 8) . As a result, the negative 1990; Dutton and Thomas 1994; Dar-El 2000, chap. 8) . As a result, the negative relationship between unit production costs and cumulative output is one of the relationship between unit production costs and cumulative output is one of the best-documented empirical regularities in economics. best-documented empirical regularities in economics.
Nonetheless, the thesis of this paper is that the conceptual transformation of Nonetheless, the thesis of this paper is that the conceptual transformation of the relationship between cost and cumulative production into an organizational the relationship between cost and cumulative production into an organizational learning curve with profound strategic implications has not been suffi ciently learning curve with profound strategic implications has not been suffi ciently supported with direct empirical evidence. In the next subsection, we describe the supported with direct empirical evidence. In the next subsection, we describe the standard formulation of the empirical relationship between cost and cumulative standard formulation of the empirical relationship between cost and cumulative output and highlight particular features of the standard model that give rise to output and highlight particular features of the standard model that give rise to important strategic implications of organizational learning: in particular, that the important strategic implications of organizational learning: in particular, that the learning must continue for an extended period of time and the amount learned in learning must continue for an extended period of time and the amount learned in any interval of time is causally infl uenced by the rate of output. The remainder of any interval of time is causally infl uenced by the rate of output. The remainder of the paper attempts to demonstrate that the evidence supporting these features is the paper attempts to demonstrate that the evidence supporting these features is surprisingly tenuous. The paper concludes with discussion of the sort of research surprisingly tenuous. The paper concludes with discussion of the sort of research that is needed to close this gap in the empirical evidence. that is needed to close this gap in the empirical evidence.
The Standard Formulation of the Organizational Learning Curve
The standard empirical formulation of the organizational learning curve The standard empirical formulation of the organizational learning curve assumes that the current unit cost of a fi rm of age assumes that the current unit cost of a fi rm of age t, , c( (t) is a decreasing function ) is a decreasing function of its cumulative prior output, of its cumulative prior output, y( (t). The form of the relationship in the standard ). The form of the relationship in the standard model is the power rule, model is the power rule, c( (t) ) = = c(0) (0) y( (t) ) --β β . In this specifi cation, unit cost declines . In this specifi cation, unit cost declines by a constant proportion with each doubling of cumulative output so, although by a constant proportion with each doubling of cumulative output so, although learning is unbounded, costs decline at a rate that falls asymptotically to zero learning is unbounded, costs decline at a rate that falls asymptotically to zero when the current output rate is held constant. The rate of learning, as captured when the current output rate is held constant. The rate of learning, as captured by by β β, is frequently summarized by the , is frequently summarized by the progress ratio, , r = = 2 2 --β β . (A lower progress ratio . (A lower progress ratio is associated with faster progress.) A progress ratio of 80 percent, for example, is associated with faster progress.) A progress ratio of 80 percent, for example, is obtained when is obtained when β β = = 0.32, and implies a unit cost reduction of 20 percent with 0.32, and implies a unit cost reduction of 20 percent with each doubling of cumulative output. The standard model follows neither Wright's each doubling of cumulative output. The standard model follows neither Wright's (1936) empirical formulation, which relates (1936) empirical formulation, which relates cumulative unit cost to cumulative unit cost to cumulative production, nor to Arrow's (1962) theoretical model, which relates current unit production, nor to Arrow's (1962) theoretical model, which relates current unit cost to cumulative cost to cumulative investment. The fi rst exposition of the standard formulation . The fi rst exposition of the standard formulation appears to be in an unpublished empirical paper by Crawford (c. 1942 ). The appears to be in an unpublished empirical paper by Crawford (c. 1942) . The standard theoretical formulation of the learning curve is much the same: cost is a standard theoretical formulation of the learning curve is much the same: cost is a deterministic declining function of cumulative output and, when parameterized, deterministic declining function of cumulative output and, when parameterized, the power rule is the preferred functional form. the power rule is the preferred functional form.
When interpreted as a statistical association, the standard formulation is not When interpreted as a statistical association, the standard formulation is not especially contentious. It has been compared with other specifi cations, and has especially contentious. It has been compared with other specifi cations, and has usually been found to fi t the data better than, or as well as, the alternatives. As usually been found to fi t the data better than, or as well as, the alternatives. As a caveat, however, note that learning curves relate two trending variables-rising a caveat, however, note that learning curves relate two trending variables-rising cumulative output and declining costs-so the explanatory power of a variety of cumulative output and declining costs-so the explanatory power of a variety of specifi cations is inevitably high: the resulting horse race (between typically nonspecifi cations is inevitably high: the resulting horse race (between typically nonnested specifi cations) is consequently reduced to a comparison of high coeffi cients nested specifi cations) is consequently reduced to a comparison of high coeffi cients of determination that differ by margins of no real economic or statistical signifiof determination that differ by margins of no real economic or statistical significance. While there is evidence that the standard formulation performs worse over cance. While there is evidence that the standard formulation performs worse over longer-time horizons and out-of-sample predictions are often poor (Alchian 1963 ; longer-time horizons and out-of-sample predictions are often poor (Alchian 1963; Hirsch 1952 Hirsch , 1956 Conway and Schultz 1959) , it has repeatedly proved useful as a Hirsch 1952 Hirsch , 1956 Conway and Schultz 1959) , it has repeatedly proved useful as a planning tool over the time horizons typical for operations research problems. planning tool over the time horizons typical for operations research problems.
However, when the standard model is used as the basis for theorizing about However, when the standard model is used as the basis for theorizing about strategy, its particular formulation takes on considerable importance. Two features strategy, its particular formulation takes on considerable importance. Two features in particular seem fundamental. First, the interval of time over which cost reducin particular seem fundamental. First, the interval of time over which cost reductions are secured needs to be suffi ciently extended so that dynamic considerations tions are secured needs to be suffi ciently extended so that dynamic considerations matter. Second, there must be a causal effect of cumulative production on current matter. Second, there must be a causal effect of cumulative production on current cost. This causal effect is of course, likely to be transmitted through some mediating cost. This causal effect is of course, likely to be transmitted through some mediating variable, but the distinctive implications of learning derive from the premise that variable, but the distinctive implications of learning derive from the premise that increasing output today will secure greater cost reductions tomorrow. Wherever increasing output today will secure greater cost reductions tomorrow. Wherever these two features are absent, familiar strategic and economic implications of these two features are absent, familiar strategic and economic implications of learning curves may be either ameliorated or overturned. This point is perhaps best learning curves may be either ameliorated or overturned. This point is perhaps best illustrated with three examples. illustrated with three examples.
First, while unbounded learning by doing has long been associated with an First, while unbounded learning by doing has long been associated with an incentive on the part of a fi rst-mover to engage in practices that deter subsequent incentive on the part of a fi rst-mover to engage in practices that deter subsequent entry (for example, Cabral and Riordan 1994) , bounded learning by doing may entry (for example, Cabral and Riordan 1994) , bounded learning by doing may have the opposite effect. Hollis (2002) has shown that, if the fi rst mover has attained, have the opposite effect. Hollis (2002) has shown that, if the fi rst mover has attained, or nearly attained, a terminal productivity at which learning by doing effects have or nearly attained, a terminal productivity at which learning by doing effects have attenuated, that fi rm will likely prefer attenuated, that fi rm will likely prefer more entry rather than less. The reason is that entry rather than less. The reason is that more entry will divide the market among more followers and slow the rate at which more entry will divide the market among more followers and slow the rate at which their costs catch up with those of the fi rst-mover. The desire to face more competitheir costs catch up with those of the fi rst-mover. The desire to face more competitors can even induce the leading fi rm to subsidize entry-for example by offering tors can even induce the leading fi rm to subsidize entry-for example by offering to license technology at a low cost. to license technology at a low cost.
Second, if learning quickly arrives at a terminal productivity, then long-run Second, if learning quickly arrives at a terminal productivity, then long-run improvements in performance cannot be the result of learning. This realization improvements in performance cannot be the result of learning. This realization led to the development of hybrid models of endogenous (macroeconomic) growth led to the development of hybrid models of endogenous (macroeconomic) growth that combine passive learning with the development of new, superior, vintages of that combine passive learning with the development of new, superior, vintages of technology from research and development activities (for example, Young 1993; technology from research and development activities (for example, Young 1993; Stein 1997) . In these models, almost any relation is possible between the rates of Stein 1997) . In these models, almost any relation is possible between the rates of learning and economic growth: an increase in the rate of learning may have no learning and economic growth: an increase in the rate of learning may have no effect on long-run growth, it may increase it, or it may decrease it. For example, effect on long-run growth, it may increase it, or it may decrease it. For example, too much learning may lead to stagnation, and stagnation may arise independently too much learning may lead to stagnation, and stagnation may arise independently of the rate of learning; learning may also induce clustering of innovations and, of the rate of learning; learning may also induce clustering of innovations and, more generally, cyclical patterns of growth. In Thompson (2010) , I provide a formal more generally, cyclical patterns of growth. In Thompson (2010) , I provide a formal analysis of these claims. analysis of these claims.
Third, the standard formulation of the organizational learning curve induces Third, the standard formulation of the organizational learning curve induces strategic behavior in which fi rms set prices lower and output higher than would strategic behavior in which fi rms set prices lower and output higher than would be warranted by static profi t maximization. Increasing output above the level that be warranted by static profi t maximization. Increasing output above the level that equates marginal cost and marginal revenue yields a benefi t in the form of lower equates marginal cost and marginal revenue yields a benefi t in the form of lower future costs. The optimal strategy increases output until the gap between marginal future costs. The optimal strategy increases output until the gap between marginal cost and revenue (that is, the foregone profi t resulting from a marginal increase in cost and revenue (that is, the foregone profi t resulting from a marginal increase in the distance of output from its static optimum) is equal to the discounted present the distance of output from its static optimum) is equal to the discounted present value of all future cost savings obtained from an increment to output today (Rosen value of all future cost savings obtained from an increment to output today (Rosen 1972) ; the effect can be strong enough to induce optimal paths for price that are 1972); the effect can be strong enough to induce optimal paths for price that are constant, that rise, or that change non-monotonically even as cost falls (for examconstant, that rise, or that change non-monotonically even as cost falls (for examples, see Spence 1981; Clarke, Darrough, and Heinecke 1982; Petrakis, Rasmusen, ples, see Spence 1981; Clarke, Darrough, and Heinecke 1982; Petrakis, Rasmusen, and Roy 1997) . and Roy 1997).
These dynamic pricing results are built on the assumption that the association These dynamic pricing results are built on the assumption that the association between output and the rate of decline of cost is causal. As a result, the fi rm has between output and the rate of decline of cost is causal. As a result, the fi rm has only one instrument, price, to attain divergent goals of static profi t maximization only one instrument, price, to attain divergent goals of static profi t maximization and dynamic cost reductions. Suppose, for example, that organizational learning is and dynamic cost reductions. Suppose, for example, that organizational learning is a function of time rather than output. In this case, cumulative output and cost are a function of time rather than output. In this case, cumulative output and cost are correlated, but changes to output have no infl uence on the path of cost. The fi rm correlated, but changes to output have no infl uence on the path of cost. The fi rm sets static marginal cost to marginal revenue at every point in time, because only the sets static marginal cost to marginal revenue at every point in time, because only the goal of static profi t maximization is susceptible to manipulation by the fi rm's policy goal of static profi t maximization is susceptible to manipulation by the fi rm's policy choices. Suppose, instead, that cost reductions are secured not by passive learning choices. Suppose, instead, that cost reductions are secured not by passive learning from experience but by purposive investments in research and development. In this from experience but by purposive investments in research and development. In this case, current output and the rate of cost reduction are correlated-thereby giving case, current output and the rate of cost reduction are correlated-thereby giving the appearance of a learning curve-but the underlying reason is that the optimal the appearance of a learning curve-but the underlying reason is that the optimal rate of investment is generally increasing in fi rm size (for example, Klepper 1996) . rate of investment is generally increasing in fi rm size (for example, Klepper 1996) . In this setting the optimal static price is set in every period because the fi rm now has In this setting the optimal static price is set in every period because the fi rm now has two instruments with which to pursue its two objectives. two instruments with which to pursue its two objectives.
To a somewhat lesser extent, it also matters that the learning rate is reasonably To a somewhat lesser extent, it also matters that the learning rate is reasonably predictable. If the learning rate is uncertain, the value of strategically increasing predictable. If the learning rate is uncertain, the value of strategically increasing output now depends on the output now depends on the expected cost savings that will be obtained in the future cost savings that will be obtained in the future as a result of having greater cumulative output. Under the standard formulation, as a result of having greater cumulative output. Under the standard formulation, however, cost savings are a concave function of the learning parameter, so any however, cost savings are a concave function of the learning parameter, so any mean-preserving increase in the subjective variance of the rate of learning reduces mean-preserving increase in the subjective variance of the rate of learning reduces the expected value of strategic behavior today. In fact, unless the occurrence of the expected value of strategic behavior today. In fact, unless the occurrence of negative learning rates has zero probability (and we will see later that it does not), negative learning rates has zero probability (and we will see later that it does not), the expected cost, the expected cost, E [ [c( (y) ] need not be a monotonic function of )] need not be a monotonic function of y: for example, if : for example, if in the standard formulation in the standard formulation β β is believed to be a draw from the normal distribution is believed to be a draw from the normal distribution with mean with mean 
Empirical Learning Curves
In this section we review some evidence on the empirical performance of the In this section we review some evidence on the empirical performance of the standard formulation. We will fi rst provide evidence suggesting that learning rates standard formulation. We will fi rst provide evidence suggesting that learning rates are indeed very unpredictable except in unusual cases, and that terminal producare indeed very unpredictable except in unusual cases, and that terminal productivities are often quickly attained. We will then show how, even in cases where the tivities are often quickly attained. We will then show how, even in cases where the standard formulation appears to work well, it may do so even though cost reducstandard formulation appears to work well, it may do so even though cost reductions are not in fact caused by increases in cumulative output. tions are not in fact caused by increases in cumulative output.
Unpredictable Learning Curves
It is well-known that younger fi rms grow faster than older fi rms (Dunne, It is well-known that younger fi rms grow faster than older fi rms (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1989), and there is evidence that at least part of this Roberts, and Samuelson 1989), and there is evidence that at least part of this is explained by more rapid productivity growth among young fi rms (de Kok, is explained by more rapid productivity growth among young fi rms (de Kok, Brouwer, and Fris 2006) . At the same time, old plants using dated technology on Brouwer, and Fris 2006). At the same time, old plants using dated technology on average have similar productivity to new plants using the latest equipment ( Jensen, average have similar productivity to new plants using the latest equipment ( Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh 2001) . These phenomena are all consistent with the stanMcGuckin, and Stiroh 2001) . These phenomena are all consistent with the standard formulation of the organizational learning curve. However, there remain dard formulation of the organizational learning curve. However, there remain enormous cross-sectional differences in fi rm productivity even after controlling for enormous cross-sectional differences in fi rm productivity even after controlling for age and output, the causes of which remain poorly understood (Bartelsman and age and output, the causes of which remain poorly understood (Bartelsman and Doms 2000). One possible explanation, of course, is that there are large variations Doms 2000). One possible explanation, of course, is that there are large variations in rates of organizational learning. in rates of organizational learning.
Recall that the Boston Consulting Group based its advice back in the 1960s on Recall that the Boston Consulting Group based its advice back in the 1960s on the claim that there was a "consistent" decline of 20-30 percent in costs each time the claim that there was a "consistent" decline of 20-30 percent in costs each time cumulative output doubled; the empirical evidence does not support this claim. cumulative output doubled; the empirical evidence does not support this claim. Figure 1 plots the distributions of 271 progress ratios collected for two different Figure 1 plots the distributions of 271 progress ratios collected for two different review articles (Ghemawat 1985; Dutton and Thomas 1994) , along with my own review articles (Ghemawat 1985; Dutton and Thomas 1994) , along with my own calculations for 11 shipyards engaged in building Liberty ships in World War II calculations for 11 shipyards engaged in building Liberty ships in World War II (broken out with dots below the horizontal axis). The central tendency of these (broken out with dots below the horizontal axis). The central tendency of these estimates is clearly around the 70-80 percent progress ratio that BCG claimed as the estimates is clearly around the 70-80 percent progress ratio that BCG claimed as the standard. But the variation around that level is in fact very large. Indeed, the fi gure standard. But the variation around that level is in fact very large. Indeed, the fi gure almost certainly underestimates the end of the distribution with near-zero and even almost certainly underestimates the end of the distribution with near-zero and even negative learning rates that would be produced by studying a random sampling of negative learning rates that would be produced by studying a random sampling of fi rms. After all, there is little value in estimating and attempting to publish learning fi rms. After all, there is little value in estimating and attempting to publish learning rates for industries where organizational learning is not expected to be present. rates for industries where organizational learning is not expected to be present.
Why do progress ratios vary so much? One explanation is that technologies Why do progress ratios vary so much? One explanation is that technologies differ across industries and products, and some are more amenable to learning than differ across industries and products, and some are more amenable to learning than others. Jordan (1958) , for example, concluded that in the airframe industry the others. Jordan (1958) , for example, concluded that in the airframe industry the proportion of labor whose pace of work was determined by machines had a strong proportion of labor whose pace of work was determined by machines had a strong infl uence on the progress ratio. Similarly, Hirsch (1956) found that progress ratios infl uence on the progress ratio. Similarly, Hirsch (1956) found that progress ratios in assembly jobs were about twice the size of machine-paced ratios. in assembly jobs were about twice the size of machine-paced ratios.
However, the extent to which technology can explain this variation is unclear. However, the extent to which technology can explain this variation is unclear. Wide variation in rates of learning have also been documented for different Wide variation in rates of learning have also been documented for different plants operating the same technology, and even for different runs on the same plants operating the same technology, and even for different runs on the same product within plants (Yelle 1979) . Even within technologies and plants, differproduct within plants (Yelle 1979) . Even within technologies and plants, differences in learning rates may refl ect the varied outcomes of "bets" by management ences in learning rates may refl ect the varied outcomes of "bets" by management and workers as to which approach will be most readily mastered (Nelson 1981) . and workers as to which approach will be most readily mastered (Nelson 1981) .
Figure 1 271 Estimated Progress Ratios
Source: Ghemawat (1985) , Dutton and Thomas (1994) , and author's calculations for Liberty shipyards. Notes: Figure 1 plots the distributions of 271 progress ratios collected for two different review articles, along with my own calculations for 11 shipyards engaged in building Liberty ships in World War II (broken out with dots below the horizontal axis). An unknown fraction of the observations from the two papers Ghemawat (1985) and Dutton and Thomas (1994) However, look at the variation in Figure 1 of the progress ratios for 11 yards engaged However, look at the variation in Figure 1 of the progress ratios for 11 yards engaged in the production of Liberty ships during World War II. Two yards, both operated in the production of Liberty ships during World War II. Two yards, both operated by J.A. Jones Construction Company, learned much more rapidly than other yards, by J.A. Jones Construction Company, learned much more rapidly than other yards, attaining ratios of about 75 percent. At the other end of the scale, the Delta Shipattaining ratios of about 75 percent. At the other end of the scale, the Delta Shipbuilding Corporation was able to attain a progress ratio of only 93 percent. What building Corporation was able to attain a progress ratio of only 93 percent. What is particularly puzzling about the Liberty ship experience is that these yards had is particularly puzzling about the Liberty ship experience is that these yards had limited ability to make different bets: they were engaged in the production of an limited ability to make different bets: they were engaged in the production of an identical, standardized ship, using the same methods in purpose-built yards with identical, standardized ship, using the same methods in purpose-built yards with similar layouts. Moreover, these yards were not in competition with each other, and similar layouts. Moreover, these yards were not in competition with each other, and considerable effort was made to share lessons learned in one yard with the others. considerable effort was made to share lessons learned in one yard with the others. Figure 2 , which plots time-series of unit labor requirements for the Jones and Figure 2 , which plots time-series of unit labor requirements for the Jones and Delta yards, suggests one reason for the difference in learning rates. The Jones yards Delta yards, suggests one reason for the difference in learning rates. The Jones yards appeared to learn so much not because they outperformed Delta, but because they appeared to learn so much not because they outperformed Delta, but because they performed so poorly until they caught up with Delta in December 1943. Unsurperformed so poorly until they caught up with Delta in December 1943. Unsurprisingly, then, cost forecasts obtained by looking at the learning rates observed in prisingly, then, cost forecasts obtained by looking at the learning rates observed in other fi rms are likely to be highly unreliable. Of course, contemporaneous planners other fi rms are likely to be highly unreliable. Of course, contemporaneous planners probably often have more information at their disposal than just the prior empirical probably often have more information at their disposal than just the prior empirical record, so that they can adjust their observations of learning at other fi rms based record, so that they can adjust their observations of learning at other fi rms based Delta on their own situation. The managers at the Jones yards, for example, were well on their own situation. The managers at the Jones yards, for example, were well aware that their startup was unusually poor. However, the extensive historical record aware that their startup was unusually poor. However, the extensive historical record (Lane 1951) offers no explanation for the poor start in the Jones yards, nor any (Lane 1951) offers no explanation for the poor start in the Jones yards, nor any evidence to suggest that managers had anticipated it. evidence to suggest that managers had anticipated it.
Formal evidence on the accuracy of contemporaneous expectations about Formal evidence on the accuracy of contemporaneous expectations about future learning is hard to come by. There is, however, some indirect evidence future learning is hard to come by. There is, however, some indirect evidence contained in the contracts under which Liberty ships were built. In contract negocontained in the contracts under which Liberty ships were built. In contract negotiations, each yard and the government agreed on the average production speeds tiations, each yard and the government agreed on the average production speeds and unit labor requirements for all ships to be delivered under the contract. The and unit labor requirements for all ships to be delivered under the contract. The base payment for each ship was set as cost plus fi xed fee. However, the governbase payment for each ship was set as cost plus fi xed fee. However, the government attempted to build incentives into each contract by paying bonuses for early ment attempted to build incentives into each contract by paying bonuses for early completion, charging fees for late delivery, allowing the yard to retain part of any completion, charging fees for late delivery, allowing the yard to retain part of any labor cost savings, and charging the yard for excess labor costs. To protect both labor cost savings, and charging the yard for excess labor costs. To protect both yards and the government from excessive fees and penalties, the contracts placed yards and the government from excessive fees and penalties, the contracts placed upper and lower bounds on the fees that could be earned. The negotiated averages upper and lower bounds on the fees that could be earned. The negotiated averages were adjusted as the war progressed, to refl ect past experience and expectations were adjusted as the war progressed, to refl ect past experience and expectations of future effi ciency gains. Of course, if projections about future effi ciency were off of future effi ciency gains. Of course, if projections about future effi ciency were off the mark, so that actual and agreed hours differed greatly, the fees would hit their the mark, so that actual and agreed hours differed greatly, the fees would hit their bounds. More often than not, this is exactly what happened. In my own study of bounds. More often than not, this is exactly what happened. In my own study of 36 contracts awarded by the government (Thompson 2001) , I found that in fully 36 contracts awarded by the government (Thompson 2001) , I found that in fully two-thirds of the contracts signed either the minimum or maximum fees were two-thirds of the contracts signed either the minimum or maximum fees were earned. In this case, contemporaneous expectations seem askew with outcomes, at earned. In this case, contemporaneous expectations seem askew with outcomes, at least in the sense that contractual protections were written that view these outcomes least in the sense that contractual protections were written that view these outcomes as extreme cases. as extreme cases.
Learning curves contained in tender documents also provide information Learning curves contained in tender documents also provide information about expectations of learning, although few have found their way into the academic about expectations of learning, although few have found their way into the academic literature. Figure 3 provides one example. In 2001, the German fi rm Babcock Noell literature. Figure 3 provides one example. In 2001, the German fi rm Babcock Noell Nuclear submitted a tender to produce superconducting dipole magnets, the largest Nuclear submitted a tender to produce superconducting dipole magnets, the largest and most complex equipment that was installed in CERN's Large Hadron Collider. and most complex equipment that was installed in CERN's Large Hadron Collider. Figure 3 shows the expected learning rate for the collared coils (the largest part of Figure 3 shows the expected learning rate for the collared coils (the largest part of the magnets), as evidenced by the tender document, along with the realized unit the magnets), as evidenced by the tender document, along with the realized unit labor hours. The agreement between expectations and outcomes is remarkable, labor hours. The agreement between expectations and outcomes is remarkable, and stands in stark contrast to the frequent forecast errors evidenced in the Liberty and stands in stark contrast to the frequent forecast errors evidenced in the Liberty ship contracts. Indeed, three fi rms were involved in production of the coils, and the ship contracts. Indeed, three fi rms were involved in production of the coils, and the forecast accuracy illustrated in Figure 3 was typical (Rossi 2004 (Rossi , 2007 . forecast accuracy illustrated in Figure 3 was typical (Rossi 2004 (Rossi , 2007 .
However, the contracts for the magnets were unusual in many respects. CERN However, the contracts for the magnets were unusual in many respects. CERN had already conducted ten years of research and development on the production had already conducted ten years of research and development on the production process before Babcock Noell became involved, during which time it had built protoprocess before Babcock Noell became involved, during which time it had built prototypes and made numerous design changes. CERN then shared this work with the types and made numerous design changes. CERN then shared this work with the fi rm as part of an extensive program of technology transfer. CERN also developed fi rm as part of an extensive program of technology transfer. CERN also developed and tested specialized tools, which were provided to Babcock Noell, along with all and tested specialized tools, which were provided to Babcock Noell, along with all the main components and ongoing engineering and technical support. As a result, the main components and ongoing engineering and technical support. As a result, "the dipoles were 'build to print' and 'build to process', with only minor degrees "the dipoles were 'build to print' and 'build to process', with only minor degrees of freedom left to the companies in certain areas, notably in the coil winding and of freedom left to the companies in certain areas, notably in the coil winding and pole assembly" (Rossi 2007) . The fi rm itself also undertook extensive preparatory pole assembly" (Rossi 2007) . The fi rm itself also undertook extensive preparatory research, in conjunction with the University of Hanover, on the sequence of operaresearch, in conjunction with the University of Hanover, on the sequence of operations necessary to manufacture the magnets. Clearly, many uncertainties that would tions necessary to manufacture the magnets. Clearly, many uncertainties that would otherwise have made learning curve forecasting a formidable task had already been otherwise have made learning curve forecasting a formidable task had already been resolved. The unusual circumstances surrounding the contracts for the magnets resolved. The unusual circumstances surrounding the contracts for the magnets perhaps serves mainly to reveal, by their absence from the situation surrounding perhaps serves mainly to reveal, by their absence from the situation surrounding the Babcock Noell tender, the driving forces behind the uncertainty over future the Babcock Noell tender, the driving forces behind the uncertainty over future learning curves that usually prevails in more typical settings. learning curves that usually prevails in more typical settings.
Terminal Productivities
Learning curves often drop toward a terminal productivity: for example, this Learning curves often drop toward a terminal productivity: for example, this fl attening out of the cost reductions appears in the Liberty ship example in Figure 2 fl attening out of the cost reductions appears in the Liberty ship example in Figure 2 and the expected and actual Babcock Noell learning curves in Figure 3 . This charand the expected and actual Babcock Noell learning curves in Figure 3 . This characteristic of learning is often overlooked. Empirical learning curve studies in other acteristic of learning is often overlooked. Empirical learning curve studies in other settings, especially in the earlier literature, contain production runs that are often settings, especially in the earlier literature, contain production runs that are often too short to ascertain whether a terminal plateau has been reached or is close at too short to ascertain whether a terminal plateau has been reached or is close at hand. But the evidence from longer production runs suggests terminal productivihand. But the evidence from longer production runs suggests terminal productivities can be attained rather quickly. ties can be attained rather quickly. To provide just one additional example, Figure 4 , taken from Conway and To provide just one additional example, Figure 4 , taken from Conway and Schultz (1959) , shows labor hours per unit required in the fi nal assembly of "a Schultz (1959), shows labor hours per unit required in the fi nal assembly of "a large electromechanical product" during a long production run in a single plant; large electromechanical product" during a long production run in a single plant; evidently, the attainment of a terminal productivity can at times be extremely abrupt. evidently, the attainment of a terminal productivity can at times be extremely abrupt. In Conway and Schultz's paper, in fact, six out of ten plots revealed compelling In Conway and Schultz's paper, in fact, six out of ten plots revealed compelling evidence that a terminal productivity had been attained and progress had stopped evidence that a terminal productivity had been attained and progress had stopped altogether. Their study was one among several that led Baloff (1966) to assert that altogether. Their study was one among several that led Baloff (1966) to assert that although the power rule curve may describe the start-up phase in manufacturing, it although the power rule curve may describe the start-up phase in manufacturing, it does not describe behavior in the long term. does not describe behavior in the long term.
Cumulative Output versus Time
The standard formulation of the learning curve supposes a The standard formulation of the learning curve supposes a causal effect of effect of cumulative production on current unit cost. But suppose that learning proceeds as cumulative production on current unit cost. But suppose that learning proceeds as a function of time rather than accumulated output (as in, for example, Jovanovic a function of time rather than accumulated output (as in, for example, Jovanovic and Nyarko 1995) . In this case, increasing output would not lead to more rapid and Nyarko 1995). In this case, increasing output would not lead to more rapid learning, undermining much of the strategic importance of the learning curve. learning, undermining much of the strategic importance of the learning curve.
Figure 4 A Learning Curve for Final Assembly of a Large Electromechanical Product
Source: Conway and Schultz (1959, fi gure 9). Notes: Both axes are log scales. The regression line fi ts a 67.8 percent progress ratio indicating that prior to attaining terminal productivity, unit costs fell by 32.2 percent with each doubling of output. The source did not provide a scale for the vertical axis.
However, a naive regression with cumulative production as the only explanatory However, a naive regression with cumulative production as the only explanatory variable would, by virtue of the trend inherent in the regressor, produce spurious variable would, by virtue of the trend inherent in the regressor, produce spurious evidence in favor of the standard formulation. evidence in favor of the standard formulation.
There is, however, a substantial literature that has confi rmed the robustness of There is, however, a substantial literature that has confi rmed the robustness of the power rule against the alternative of a possible time trend by running regresthe power rule against the alternative of a possible time trend by running regressions of the form sions of the form ln(c t ) = a 0 + a 1 ln(y t -1 ) + a 2 t + u t , in which c t is unit cost at time t, y t -1 is cumulative output during the previous time period, and the coeffi cient on t captures the time trend. Typical results (for example, Rapping 1965) are that separate regressions of ln(c t ) on ln(y t -1 ) and on t each fi t about equally well. However, when the two regressors are included together, the coeffi cient on ln(y t ) is statistically signifi cant and negative while the coeffi cient on calendar time is either insignifi cant or of the wrong sign.
Under conditions typical of learning curve studies, it is hard to determine Under conditions typical of learning curve studies, it is hard to determine which of these results is more reliable. High degrees of serial correlation in producwhich of these results is more reliable. High degrees of serial correlation in productivity regressions is a common phenomenon (for example, Olley and Pakes 1996), tivity regressions is a common phenomenon (for example, Olley and Pakes 1996), and they appear to be especially problematic in learning curve estimation. For and they appear to be especially problematic in learning curve estimation. For example, Benkard (2000, table 1) reports fi rst-order serial correlation coeffi cients example, Benkard (2000, table 1) reports fi rst-order serial correlation coeffi cients of 0.73 and 0.97 in his basic learning curve estimates for Lockheed aircraft, while of 0.73 and 0.97 in his basic learning curve estimates for Lockheed aircraft, while Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) report signifi cant third-degree serial correlaArgote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) report signifi cant third-degree serial correlation in their shipbuilding study. The problem for ordinary least squares estimation tion in their shipbuilding study. The problem for ordinary least squares estimation of a regression equation, of course, is that serial correlation induces a correlation of a regression equation, of course, is that serial correlation induces a correlation between lagged cumulative output and the disturbance: a negative shock to cost between lagged cumulative output and the disturbance: a negative shock to cost generally induces a fi rm to hire more inputs and increase output, so that next perigenerally induces a fi rm to hire more inputs and increase output, so that next period's shock is correlated not only with the current shock but also current cumulative od's shock is correlated not only with the current shock but also current cumulative output. This correlation leads to an overestimation of the magnitude of the coefoutput. This correlation leads to an overestimation of the magnitude of the coeffi cient on cumulative output and, because time and cumulative output are positively fi cient on cumulative output and, because time and cumulative output are positively correlated, to an attenuation of the coeffi cient on time. correlated, to an attenuation of the coeffi cient on time.
To show that serial correlation may induce serious problems in learning To show that serial correlation may induce serious problems in learning curve regressions, we constructed artifi cial data sets under the assumption that curve regressions, we constructed artifi cial data sets under the assumption that costs decline only as a function of time, such that the true coeffi cients in the costs decline only as a function of time, such that the true coeffi cients in the earlier equation are earlier equation are a 1 1 = = 0 and 0 and a 2 2 = = -.03. Samples of 100 observations were then -.03. Samples of 100 observations were then constructed, where the fi rm's output level is chosen optimally given its current cost constructed, where the fi rm's output level is chosen optimally given its current cost and the elasticity of demand. We then used the regression above, which include and the elasticity of demand. We then used the regression above, which include both a term for cumulative output and a time trend, to estimate the coeffi cients both a term for cumulative output and a time trend, to estimate the coeffi cients for this data. The results are summarized in Figure 5 . When serial correlation is for this data. The results are summarized in Figure 5 . When serial correlation is modest with a correlation coeffi cient of modest with a correlation coeffi cient of ρ ρ = = 0.2, the regressions return accurate 0.2, the regressions return accurate results: the coeffi cient on time is around -.03, while the coeffi cient on cumulative results: the coeffi cient on time is around -.03, while the coeffi cient on cumulative output is centered around zero. In contrast, when serial correlation becomes more output is centered around zero. In contrast, when serial correlation becomes more extreme with extreme with ρ ρ = = 0.8, the coeffi cient on time is strongly attenuated, sometimes 0.8, the coeffi cient on time is strongly attenuated, sometimes the wrong sign, and frequently statistically insignifi cant, while the coeffi cient on the wrong sign, and frequently statistically insignifi cant, while the coeffi cient on cumulative output is large in magnitude (and always signifi cant). These effects are cumulative output is large in magnitude (and always signifi cant). These effects are most pronounced when the elasticity of demand is high, so that output responds most pronounced when the elasticity of demand is high, so that output responds strongly to cost shocks. As a result, when serial correlation is suffi ciently strong, strongly to cost shocks. As a result, when serial correlation is suffi ciently strong, an ordinary least squares approach incorrectly supports the standard formulation. an ordinary least squares approach incorrectly supports the standard formulation.
The solution, of course, is to fi nd settings in which cost shocks do not induce The solution, of course, is to fi nd settings in which cost shocks do not induce changes in input use, or to fi nd valid instruments for cumulative output. In changes in input use, or to fi nd valid instruments for cumulative output. In Thompson (2001) , I made the case that the Liberty ship program is an instance of Thompson (2001) , I made the case that the Liberty ship program is an instance of the former solution, but such settings are almost vanishingly rare. Unsurprisingly, the former solution, but such settings are almost vanishingly rare. Unsurprisingly, since the much greater part of the empirical learning curve literature predates since the much greater part of the empirical learning curve literature predates the wide use of instrumental variable techniques (Angrist and Krueger 2001) , the the wide use of instrumental variable techniques (Angrist and Krueger 2001) , the body of literature offering reliable support for the standard formulation is smaller body of literature offering reliable support for the standard formulation is smaller than is generally supposed. One exception worth mentioning is Benkard's (2000) than is generally supposed. One exception worth mentioning is Benkard's (2000) Figure 5
Regression Coeffi cients on Artifi cial Learning Curve Data
Source: Author's calculations. Notes: The data generation process is ln(c t ) = 4.6 -0.03t + u t , where u t = ρu t -1 + v t and v t is Gaussian with var(v t ) = 0.04. The estimated regression is ln(c t ) = a 0 + a 1 ln(y t -1 ) + a 2 t + u t , where y t = y t -1 + x t is cumulative output. Demand is of the constant elasticity type, x t = A p t ε , and x t is obtained upon setting the monopoly markup price. Sample size is 100. Shaded (unshaded) markers indicate a coeffi cient on time that is statistically signifi cant (insignifi cant) at the 5 percent level. The R 2 in all regressions exceeds 0.96. ρ is serial correlation, and e is elasticity of demand. 
Sources of Learning
How does a rise in cumulative output reduce costs? Remarkably little is underHow does a rise in cumulative output reduce costs? Remarkably little is understood about what this mechanism might be. After reviewing the evidence on learning stood about what this mechanism might be. After reviewing the evidence on learning in Liberty shipyards, Lucas (1993, p. 262) concluded: in Liberty shipyards, Lucas (1993, p. 262 ) concluded: There is . . . considerable ambiguity about what this evidence means. Is it the individual worker who is doing the learning? The managers? The organization as a whole? Are the skills being learned specifi c to the production process on which the learning takes place, or more general? Does learning accrue solely to the individual worker, manager, or organization that does the producing, or is some of it readily appropriable by outside observers?
We do not have answers to these questions. However, it seems implausible that organizational learning can be explained as an aggregation of worker learning, and therefore the reduction in costs as cumulative output rises must be in some broad sense organizational in nature. In this section, after fi rst making the case against aggregation of individual learning, we will review some examples in which the principle sources of sustained organizational learning seem to have been identifi ed. In a number of examples where apparent learning has been sustained, the drivers of cost reduction within the organization are often not fully consistent with the standard formulation of the organizational learning curve.
Can Individual Learning Explain Organizational Learning?
The standard pattern in datasets of individual learning is that productivity The standard pattern in datasets of individual learning is that productivity quickly attains an upper bound. For example, Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) collected quickly attains an upper bound. For example, Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) collected a number of datasets on individual learning. As one example, they offer evidence a number of datasets on individual learning. As one example, they offer evidence that the productivity of new line-workers at a British munitions factory in World that the productivity of new line-workers at a British munitions factory in World War I attained an upper bound within fi ve weeks of initiating employment. Waldman, War I attained an upper bound within fi ve weeks of initiating employment. Waldman, Yourstone, and Smith (2003) report similar results for surgeons, while Mazur and Yourstone, and Smith (2003) report similar results for surgeons, while Mazur and Hastie (1978) have found rapid exhaustion of learning in laboratory experiments. Hastie (1978) have found rapid exhaustion of learning in laboratory experiments. This evidence is consistent with popular theoretical models of individual learning, This evidence is consistent with popular theoretical models of individual learning, including the replacement and accumulation models popular among psycholoincluding the replacement and accumulation models popular among psychologists (Restle and Greeno 1970) , as well as with the Bayesian "dial-setting model" of gists (Restle and Greeno 1970) , as well as with the Bayesian "dial-setting model" of Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) . Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) .
One of the challenges in drawing inferences about organizational learning One of the challenges in drawing inferences about organizational learning from individual learning is that workers come and go, so the translation from from individual learning is that workers come and go, so the translation from worker learning to organizational learning cannot be a one-to-one mapping. Is worker learning to organizational learning cannot be a one-to-one mapping. Is there some way in which the continual arrival of new workers might translate into there some way in which the continual arrival of new workers might translate into an extended period of organizational learning? Probably not-but here is some of an extended period of organizational learning? Probably not-but here is some of the underlying analysis. the underlying analysis.
First, imagine that labor turnover is independent of job tenure. In this case, with First, imagine that labor turnover is independent of job tenure. In this case, with workers coming and going, individual learning does nothing to extend the duration workers coming and going, individual learning does nothing to extend the duration of the organizational learning phase: mean output per worker simply attains, at of the organizational learning phase: mean output per worker simply attains, at the same speed, a lower terminal value than individual output. Next, imagine that the same speed, a lower terminal value than individual output. Next, imagine that the rate at which workers separate from jobs tends to decline with job tenure, which the rate at which workers separate from jobs tends to decline with job tenure, which seems the common pattern ( Jovanovic 1979) . This pattern does serve to delay seems the common pattern ( Jovanovic 1979) . This pattern does serve to delay the time at which the organization attains its terminal productivity, but it seems the time at which the organization attains its terminal productivity, but it seems doubtful that the effect can be suffi ciently strong for our purposes. For example, doubtful that the effect can be suffi ciently strong for our purposes. For example, I carried out simulation results in which workers attain their terminal productivity I carried out simulation results in which workers attain their terminal productivity after six months employment, and the separation rate of workers declines in exagafter six months employment, and the separation rate of workers declines in exaggerated fashion, from 20 percent in the fi rst period to only 2 percent for workers gerated fashion, from 20 percent in the fi rst period to only 2 percent for workers with tenure of six months or more. The effect is only to increase the time taken with tenure of six months or more. The effect is only to increase the time taken to approach the fi rm's terminal productivity from 6 to 12 months, not nearly the to approach the fi rm's terminal productivity from 6 to 12 months, not nearly the length of the organizational learning curves that we see. (Conversely, a separation length of the organizational learning curves that we see. (Conversely, a separation rate that increases with job tenure would accelerate the speed at which individual rate that increases with job tenure would accelerate the speed at which individual learning translates into the associated organizational learning.) learning translates into the associated organizational learning.)
Further delays in the translation of individual learning into the attainment Further delays in the translation of individual learning into the attainment of the organization's terminal productivity could arise if the fi rm is able to learn of the organization's terminal productivity could arise if the fi rm is able to learn and exploit variations in individual learning rates to reallocate workers to the most and exploit variations in individual learning rates to reallocate workers to the most appropriate tasks (Prescott and Visscher 1980) , and if this reallocation takes a suffiappropriate tasks (Prescott and Visscher 1980) , and if this reallocation takes a sufficient amount of time. The process may also be drawn out beyond the period in cient amount of time. The process may also be drawn out beyond the period in which individuals learn as the fi rm dismisses workers that have failed to learn and which individuals learn as the fi rm dismisses workers that have failed to learn and hires replacements who have yet to demonstrate their ability to learn. However, hires replacements who have yet to demonstrate their ability to learn. However, Figure 6 , which charts time-to-build for the French supplier of magnets to the Large Figure 6 , which charts time-to-build for the French supplier of magnets to the Large Hadron Collider, offers some good evidence against these hypotheses. The observed Hadron Collider, offers some good evidence against these hypotheses. The observed learning curve shows three episodes in which there is a large decline in the speed learning curve shows three episodes in which there is a large decline in the speed of production. These are associated with intensive recruitment episodes, at times of production. These are associated with intensive recruitment episodes, at times indicated by the bold arrows, involving increases in employment of direct labor indicated by the bold arrows, involving increases in employment of direct labor of 300 percent, 50 percent, and 33 percent. Despite these very disruptive adjustof 300 percent, 50 percent, and 33 percent. Despite these very disruptive adjustments to the size of the workforce, and the specialized fi rm-specifi c human capital ments to the size of the workforce, and the specialized fi rm-specifi c human capital required for production, productivity returned to trend very quickly. The evidence required for production, productivity returned to trend very quickly. The evidence strongly suggests that worker learning and organizational learning are driven by strongly suggests that worker learning and organizational learning are driven by substantively different processes. substantively different processes.
I know of only one case in which variations in labor turnover can explain a I know of only one case in which variations in labor turnover can explain a mapping from rapid individual learning to sustained and more gradual organizamapping from rapid individual learning to sustained and more gradual organizational learning. The story is worth telling, largely because it is exceptional. David tional learning. The story is worth telling, largely because it is exceptional. David (1973) essentially no capital investment during 20 years that followed the founding of the essentially no capital investment during 20 years that followed the founding of the mill-in particular, every loom that had been installed in 1834 was still in operation mill-in particular, every loom that had been installed in 1834 was still in operation in 1856. Nonetheless, output per worker rose by an average 2 percent per year in 1856. Nonetheless, output per worker rose by an average 2 percent per year during this period. during this period.
Using detailed personnel records that survive in the Baker Library at Harvard, Using detailed personnel records that survive in the Baker Library at Harvard, Bessen (2003) shows how the organizational learning at Lowell is explained by a Bessen (2003) shows how the organizational learning at Lowell is explained by a fundamental demographic shift that took place in Lowell over the period 1834-56. fundamental demographic shift that took place in Lowell over the period 1834-56. In the 1830s, the labor force in the mill consisted primarily of " Yankee farm girls," In the 1830s, the labor force in the mill consisted primarily of " Yankee farm girls," who lived in boarding houses under paternalistic contractual arrangements with the who lived in boarding houses under paternalistic contractual arrangements with the mill. The farm girls were literate, but two characteristics limited their productivity. mill. The farm girls were literate, but two characteristics limited their productivity. First, they tended to have little experience, it being the norm to abandon work in First, they tended to have little experience, it being the norm to abandon work in the mills upon marriage. Second, they frequently did not work in the mills during the mills upon marriage. Second, they frequently did not work in the mills during the summer, either returning to the farm to help during a busy time of year or the summer, either returning to the farm to help during a busy time of year or taking summer teaching jobs. Both characteristics limited the extent to which the taking summer teaching jobs. Both characteristics limited the extent to which the farm girls could learn from experience. farm girls could learn from experience.
Beginning in the late 1830s the supply of farm girls began to fall behind Beginning in the late 1830s the supply of farm girls began to fall behind demand: the number of mills in Lowell doubled between 1835 and 1847, at the demand: the number of mills in Lowell doubled between 1835 and 1847, at the same time that the New England farming population was declining. Offsetting same time that the New England farming population was declining. Offsetting these changes, the population of Lowell rose markedly, primarily due to an infl ux these changes, the population of Lowell rose markedly, primarily due to an infl ux of Irish-born immigrants. These new arrivals had fewer outside opportunities and of Irish-born immigrants. These new arrivals had fewer outside opportunities and consequently lower labor turnover rates. Coincident with these demographic shifts, consequently lower labor turnover rates. Coincident with these demographic shifts, managers began to increase the number of looms per worker fi rst from two to three managers began to increase the number of looms per worker fi rst from two to three in the early 1840s, and then four a few years later. The capital deepening has been in the early 1840s, and then four a few years later. The capital deepening has been termed the "stretch-out." termed the "stretch-out." Bessen argues that the increase in the number of looms per worker was a Bessen argues that the increase in the number of looms per worker was a natural response to declines in the rate of labor turnover. To support this claim, natural response to declines in the rate of labor turnover. To support this claim, Bessen shows that workers assigned to just two looms learned more quickly than Bessen shows that workers assigned to just two looms learned more quickly than those assigned to three or four, although the latter eventually became more producthose assigned to three or four, although the latter eventually became more productive. Initial productivity for those working on two looms was about 25 percent of tive. Initial productivity for those working on two looms was about 25 percent of terminal productivity, and it took about six months to attain terminal producterminal productivity, and it took about six months to attain terminal productivity. For those working on three or four looms, initial productivity was less than tivity. For those working on three or four looms, initial productivity was less than 20 percent of terminal productivity, which took a year to attain. The profi tability 20 percent of terminal productivity, which took a year to attain. The profi tability of the stretch-out therefore depended upon the labor turnover rate: workers must of the stretch-out therefore depended upon the labor turnover rate: workers must have been expected to remain in the job long enough to recoup the greater initial have been expected to remain in the job long enough to recoup the greater initial investment in human capital associated with assignment to more than two looms. investment in human capital associated with assignment to more than two looms. Bessen calculates the profi tability of the stretch-out directly as a function of the Bessen calculates the profi tability of the stretch-out directly as a function of the turnover rate: it was profi table in the 1840s after suffi cient numbers of immigrants turnover rate: it was profi table in the 1840s after suffi cient numbers of immigrants were working the mills, he concludes, but not in 1834 when Yankee farm girls domiwere working the mills, he concludes, but not in 1834 when Yankee farm girls dominated the workforce. nated the workforce.
While the Lowell mills illustrate a case in which bounded individual learning While the Lowell mills illustrate a case in which bounded individual learning translated into much longer-term organizational productivity growth, it did so only translated into much longer-term organizational productivity growth, it did so only as a result of profound changes in demography and the characteristics of labor. But as a result of profound changes in demography and the characteristics of labor. But this situation is obviously rare. When most people refer to organizational learning this situation is obviously rare. When most people refer to organizational learning curves, they are usually referring to a roughly similar workforce and capital stock curves, they are usually referring to a roughly similar workforce and capital stock over time, which nonetheless experiences steady reductions in unit costs as cumulaover time, which nonetheless experiences steady reductions in unit costs as cumulative output rises. tive output rises.
Organization-Level Drivers
The most obvious danger in estimating organizational learning curves is that the The most obvious danger in estimating organizational learning curves is that the conventional measure of experience, cumulative output, is correlated with variables conventional measure of experience, cumulative output, is correlated with variables known to be associated with higher productivity but that are often not available to the known to be associated with higher productivity but that are often not available to the researcher. For example, greater cumulative output is often correlated with a higher researcher. For example, greater cumulative output is often correlated with a higher base of installed capital, and the omission of capital investment has proved particubase of installed capital, and the omission of capital investment has proved particularly problematic in the interpretation of some classic case studies. For example, in larly problematic in the interpretation of some classic case studies. For example, in Thompson (2001) , I point out that early studies of the Liberty shipbuilding program, Thompson (2001) , I point out that early studies of the Liberty shipbuilding program, which did not have access to data on the capital stock, constructed a crude proxy for which did not have access to data on the capital stock, constructed a crude proxy for capital that was essentially constant over time. I recovered capital stock data from capital that was essentially constant over time. I recovered capital stock data from the National Archives for six of the 13 Liberty shipyards, showing dramatic increases the National Archives for six of the 13 Liberty shipyards, showing dramatic increases in installed capital that coincided with reductions in the unit labor requirement. in installed capital that coincided with reductions in the unit labor requirement. I concluded that for these yards, more than half of the increase in output per worker I concluded that for these yards, more than half of the increase in output per worker was accounted for by capital deepening. Similarly, Mishina (1999) undertook a was accounted for by capital deepening. Similarly, Mishina (1999) undertook a closer look at Alchian's (1963) sample of aircraft factories, concluding that, inter closer look at Alchian's (1963) sample of aircraft factories, concluding that, inter alia, capital investments were a signifi cant source of labor productivity growth in the alia, capital investments were a signifi cant source of labor productivity growth in the production of the fl ying fortress bomber. production of the fl ying fortress bomber.
An especially interesting example of potential omitted variable bias is found in An especially interesting example of potential omitted variable bias is found in Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen's (2000) look inside the specialty chemicals division of a Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen's (2000) look inside the specialty chemicals division of a Fortune 500 company. The authors had privileged access to a wealth of information, Fortune 500 company. The authors had privileged access to a wealth of information, including batch-specifi c manufacturing costs and output for over 100 chemicals, including batch-specifi c manufacturing costs and output for over 100 chemicals, and (most remarkably) and (most remarkably) chemical-specifi c expenditures on research and development.
expenditures on research and development. What makes this study especially interesting is that it documents, within a single What makes this study especially interesting is that it documents, within a single case, instances of likely omitted variable bias because of the coexistence of different case, instances of likely omitted variable bias because of the coexistence of different sources of cost reduction within a single fi rm, including instances where production sources of cost reduction within a single fi rm, including instances where production experience clearly plays a role. experience clearly plays a role. Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen (2000) estimated chemical-specifi c learning curves Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen (2000) estimated chemical-specifi c learning curves for 120 chemicals produced in batches. These chemicals were divided into two groups. for 120 chemicals produced in batches. These chemicals were divided into two groups. In one, chemicals were the subject of a formal research and development effort In one, chemicals were the subject of a formal research and development effort aimed at improving the production process. In the other group, which we shall call aimed at improving the production process. In the other group, which we shall call the informal research and development group, no attempt was made to modify the the informal research and development group, no attempt was made to modify the production process, but all of the chemicals were the subject of a project intended production process, but all of the chemicals were the subject of a project intended to reduce the amount of interim testing that took place during production. For each to reduce the amount of interim testing that took place during production. For each chemical in this latter group, a team was formed to study which stages of the producchemical in this latter group, a team was formed to study which stages of the production process always seemed to run smoothly and therefore did not need testing. tion process always seemed to run smoothly and therefore did not need testing. Table 1 reports the distribution of estimated learning rates, Table 1 reports the distribution of estimated learning rates, ˆ β . There is a . There is a marked contrast between the informal and formal research and development marked contrast between the informal and formal research and development groups. The groups. The ˆ β s are positive for almost all the chemicals in the formal research and s are positive for almost all the chemicals in the formal research and development groups, with an average of 1.20; the average for the informal R&D development groups, with an average of 1.20; the average for the informal R&D group is only one-tenth the size, with many estimates reporting rising costs over group is only one-tenth the size, with many estimates reporting rising costs over time. The table further divides the informal research and development group time. The table further divides the informal research and development group into two subgroups: chemicals for which the study team was successful in reducing into two subgroups: chemicals for which the study team was successful in reducing testing costs and those for which it was not. The former subgroup looks much like testing costs and those for which it was not. The former subgroup looks much like the research and development group: all learning rates are positive, with a mean the research and development group: all learning rates are positive, with a mean of 1.04. Among the latter subgroup, in contrast, the learning rates are all over the of 1.04. Among the latter subgroup, in contrast, the learning rates are all over the place with on average a negative learning rate. place with on average a negative learning rate.
What can be learned from these results? Consider fi rst the formal research What can be learned from these results? Consider fi rst the formal research and development group, which exhibited the highest learning rates. One possible and development group, which exhibited the highest learning rates. One possible conclusion is that the apparent learning curves refl ect an omitted variable biasconclusion is that the apparent learning curves refl ect an omitted variable biasthat research and development, and not learning in the sense intended by the that research and development, and not learning in the sense intended by the standard formulation, is the driver of cost reductions. An alternative conclusion is standard formulation, is the driver of cost reductions. An alternative conclusion is that that production experience revealed which chemicals had problems that might that that production experience revealed which chemicals had problems that might be addressed by research and development, so formal research and development be addressed by research and development, so formal research and development just happens in this case to be the channel through which experience was medijust happens in this case to be the channel through which experience was mediated. Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen (2000) argue that experience had little effect on ated. Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen (2000) argue that experience had little effect on the amount of formal research and development conducted, noting that requests the amount of formal research and development conducted, noting that requests for process research and development on a particular chemical most commonly for process research and development on a particular chemical most commonly came from marketing and sales personnel after they had identifi ed a large potential came from marketing and sales personnel after they had identifi ed a large potential demand if only production could be scaled up and units costs reduced. Unfortudemand if only production could be scaled up and units costs reduced. Unfortunately, we cannot know how much experience aided the marketing and sales team nately, we cannot know how much experience aided the marketing and sales team in their deliberations. in their deliberations.
Ambiguities also exist in the interpretation of the results for the informal Ambiguities also exist in the interpretation of the results for the informal research and development group. The information used to decide whether elimiresearch and development group. The information used to decide whether eliminating a test was prudent clearly came from prior experience, indicating that in nating a test was prudent clearly came from prior experience, indicating that in this group informal research and development was indeed a mediating channel for this group informal research and development was indeed a mediating channel for experience. However, we do not know whether testing reductions were more likely experience. However, we do not know whether testing reductions were more likely to be made among chemicals with greater cumulative output. Thus, even within to be made among chemicals with greater cumulative output. Thus, even within the informal research and development group, the study is silent on the accuracy the informal research and development group, the study is silent on the accuracy of the standard formulation of the experience curve, on which so much of the straof the standard formulation of the experience curve, on which so much of the strategic importance of organizational learning depends. tegic importance of organizational learning depends.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to offer a cautionary note about the thesis In this paper, we have attempted to offer a cautionary note about the thesis of organizational learning-by-doing. In the standard formulation of organizational of organizational learning-by-doing. In the standard formulation of organizational learning, cost reductions are obtained as a predictable by-product of accumulated learning, cost reductions are obtained as a predictable by-product of accumulated production volume, through a process of learning that continues without limit. production volume, through a process of learning that continues without limit. The reliability of these assumptions matters, because much of our understanding The reliability of these assumptions matters, because much of our understanding of the economic and strategic implications of organizational learning is built upon of the economic and strategic implications of organizational learning is built upon models that use the standard formulation. However, key components of the stanmodels that use the standard formulation. However, key components of the standard model may be less reliable than is typically supposed: not only are variations dard model may be less reliable than is typically supposed: not only are variations in the rate of learning diffi cult to predict, they are diffi cult to understand after the in the rate of learning diffi cult to predict, they are diffi cult to understand after the fact; learning often stops suddenly, with productivity frequently attaining a terminal fact; learning often stops suddenly, with productivity frequently attaining a terminal value after quite a short period of time; and evidence that cumulative output is the value after quite a short period of time; and evidence that cumulative output is the driver of cost reductions is contaminated by a variety of econometric diffi culties. driver of cost reductions is contaminated by a variety of econometric diffi culties.
A large part of the diffi culty is that the standard formulation of the organiza-A large part of the diffi culty is that the standard formulation of the organizational learning curve is a reduced form for what is in reality a complex and varied tional learning curve is a reduced form for what is in reality a complex and varied set of processes by which fi rms secure increases in productivity. In some cases-for set of processes by which fi rms secure increases in productivity. In some cases-for example where workers in a new fi rm learn on the job-production experience may example where workers in a new fi rm learn on the job-production experience may have quite direct effects on performance. In such cases, however, the learning process have quite direct effects on performance. In such cases, however, the learning process appears to be bounded and quite short-lived. In other instances, experience may appears to be bounded and quite short-lived. In other instances, experience may affect performance only when managers undertake costly actions, such as research affect performance only when managers undertake costly actions, such as research and development. These mediated effects may well lead to learning gains that are and development. These mediated effects may well lead to learning gains that are more drawn out, but they are especially diffi cult to interpret. Indeed, in many cases more drawn out, but they are especially diffi cult to interpret. Indeed, in many cases the observed relationship between unit and cumulative quantity produced may be the observed relationship between unit and cumulative quantity produced may be only coincidental, rather than evidence of a true mediated learning-by-doing effect. only coincidental, rather than evidence of a true mediated learning-by-doing effect.
Economists continue to have remarkably little understanding of the processes Economists continue to have remarkably little understanding of the processes by which production experiences translate into organizational learning-by-doing by which production experiences translate into organizational learning-by-doing and, until we do, we will continue to lack the sort of evidence necessary to justify our and, until we do, we will continue to lack the sort of evidence necessary to justify our theorizing about its strategic importance. Developing an understanding requires theorizing about its strategic importance. Developing an understanding requires that we continue to dig deep into the workings of individual fi rms. However, as that we continue to dig deep into the workings of individual fi rms. However, as Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen's (2000) study of the specialty chemical fi rm illus- Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen's (2000) study of the specialty chemical fi rm illustrates, doing so depends on fortuitous access to internal information that only trates, doing so depends on fortuitous access to internal information that only rarely becomes available. Even then, the complexity of real life within large fi rms is rarely becomes available. Even then, the complexity of real life within large fi rms is likely to raise more questions than the available information can answer. likely to raise more questions than the available information can answer.
One way around such complexity is to identify instances in which the effects of One way around such complexity is to identify instances in which the effects of experience are expected to be relatively transparent. The construction of the dipole experience are expected to be relatively transparent. The construction of the dipole magnets for CERN discussed earlier is one such case, and there is surely much more magnets for CERN discussed earlier is one such case, and there is surely much more we can learn from that historic construction project. The repeated improvements in we can learn from that historic construction project. The repeated improvements in yields observed in the production of successive generations of semiconductors (for yields observed in the production of successive generations of semiconductors (for example, Irwin and Klenow 1994) may be another such setting. In a notable recent example, Irwin and Klenow 1994) may be another such setting. In a notable recent example of the sort of research we have been lacking, Levitt, List, and Syverson example of the sort of research we have been lacking, Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) study how a large automobile plant eliminated defects in a new car model. (2012) study how a large automobile plant eliminated defects in a new car model. Exploiting what appears to be essentially unfettered access to the plant's internal Exploiting what appears to be essentially unfettered access to the plant's internal records, they are able to show, inter alia, that organizational learning was not records, they are able to show, inter alia, that organizational learning was not embodied in workers and that defects arose from problematic operations underembodied in workers and that defects arose from problematic operations undertaken at individual stations along the production line, and in addition to document taken at individual stations along the production line, and in addition to document the speed with which these operations were improved. the speed with which these operations were improved.
However, limiting studies to cases where the effects of experience are expected However, limiting studies to cases where the effects of experience are expected to be transparent can only be the fi rst step. This is because in such cases the learning to be transparent can only be the fi rst step. This is because in such cases the learning curve will, almost by construction, be short-lived, and hence of no relevance to curve will, almost by construction, be short-lived, and hence of no relevance to strategy. Indeed, in Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) , 90 percent of the total reducstrategy. Indeed, in Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) , 90 percent of the total reduction in defect rates was attained in just six weeks. Developing analogous studies over tion in defect rates was attained in just six weeks. Developing analogous studies over the much longer time horizons relevant to strategy seems a much harder problem. the much longer time horizons relevant to strategy seems a much harder problem.
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